

Phantasmapolis：科技現代性與科技東方主義

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Phantasmapolis: Techno-Modernity and Techno-Orientalism

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當我們在討論「科幻」(Science-Fiction) 類型時，我們究竟在指涉何物？美國電影理論家薇薇安·索巴克 (Vivian Sobchack) 認為，科幻電影作為一種類型電影，「強調在社會脈絡下互動的真實科學、推想性科學、思辨科學以及實徵方法」。¹ 除此之外，薇薇安·索巴克亦認為，即便在美國脈絡下的科幻電影較少提及魔法及宗教上的先驗主義，但科幻類型電影本身即為了「調節人與未知之間的關係」。² 然而究竟我們要如何來討論「科幻」在亞洲？以亞洲作為一種區域限制來討論「科幻」是否有其論述上的主動性及意義？

當我們在亞洲各地的文化脈絡下討論薇薇安·索巴克所論述的「調節人與未知之間的關係」時，第一印象反而會聯想到亞洲各地的神話及民間故事。不論是印度的史詩《羅摩衍那》(Ramayana)、中國民間故事《桃花源》，還是日本民間故事《浦島太郎》(Urashima Tarō)，皆串聯了人類與未知世界之間的關係。上述提及的例證不僅帶領讀者或聽眾進入到未知的神祕世界，同時皆牽涉到飛天遁地的異空間和異於人世的異質時間關係。

認真討論起來，筆者所舉例的史詩及民間故事，以及更多不勝枚舉的亞洲古典文本，似乎和科幻文本並無太大差異：那到底是什麼因素使得我們認為這些民俗文化並不算是科幻文本？最主要的原因還是來自於以西方本位主義所述說的科幻文本，必須要與「科學」(science) 有所關聯。也因此，即便是西方自身，也排除掉了古代希臘及北歐神話作為科幻文本的可能性。自瑪麗·雪萊 (Mary Shelley) 的《科學怪人》(Frankenstein, 1818) 以來，科幻文本便致力於處理科學革命及工業革命之後，未知技術與人類之間的關係。

換句話說，對於西方而言，科幻文本是奠定於西方中心主義中的「科技現代性」(techno-modernity)。所謂的「科技現代性」不僅將歷史時間軸線想像為進步史觀，同時對於進步與落後的二元觀點，是取決於社會對於現代科技及科學的掌握能力。我們也可以說，在「科技現代性」的視角之下，「現代」於否不僅是時間問題，亦是「技術／科技」問題；所謂「現代化」，便是「科學化」及「科技化」。

也因此，在「科技現代性」及進步史觀的視角之下，歐洲及北美以外的廣大世界，自十九世紀起，被視作「科技現代性」的被動接受者 (receivers)。也就是說，對於亞洲、非洲及拉丁美洲的開發中國家而言，它們要邁向現代化的道途，便僅能透過不斷地吸收及學習來自西方的科學和技術知識，藉此才能「趕上」西方世界，並完成自身內部的現代化。也就是說，西方世界以外的廣大區域，已經被預設為現代科技技術的消費者，而非生產者及創造者。但這樣的刻板印象及偏見，在冷戰時期開始便遭逢重大的挑戰。

¹ Sobchack, V., *Screening Space: The American Science Fiction Film* (2nd ed.) (New York: The Ungar Publishing Company, 1980), 63. 此處引用之原文如下：「The SF film is a film genre which emphasizes actual, extrapolative, or speculative science and the empirical method, interacting in a social context ...」。

² 出處同上。此處引用之原文如下（承接上文）：「...interacting in a social context with the lesser emphasized, but still represent, transcendentalism of magic and religion, in an attempt to reconcile man with the unknow.」。

冷戰時期全球經濟板塊的位移，在亞洲大陸創造出一批新興的已開發國家及強健的經濟／科技複合體。先是 1950 至 1960 年代日本經濟崛起，並於 1980 年代達到其泡沫經濟的高峰。接著是 1970 年代至 1980 年代出現的「亞洲四小龍」（Four Asian Tigers），創造了以南韓、臺灣、香港及新加坡所構成的富裕經濟廊帶。亞洲第三波的經濟發展，於 1990 年代至 2000 年代以新興中國作為核心；2010 年代起則轉變為以印度及東南亞等地為主的新興市場。

高速發展的經濟及隨之而來的技術突破，翻轉了十九世紀的世界結構。自工業革命以來，有史以來第一次，陸陸續續在非西方世界出現了科技領域及應用工程領域上的突破；而這些突破，自然也造成了科幻文本創作上的質變。1964 年的東京夏季奧林匹克運動會及 1970 年大阪萬國博覽會不僅是日本首次舉辦該大型活動，亦是亞洲首次舉辦此類國際展會。日本為藉機展現其現代化的果實，除了興建諸如「首都高速道路」等現代化設施外，甚至投入全球首座實用化的高速鐵路系統「新幹線」。

到了 1980 年代為止，日本因挾著技術及資本上的優勢，已經改變了全球的產業結構；除了消費型電子商品及汽車等高技術資本工業，已逐漸由日本產品占有絕對的優勢外，日本資本亦於 1980 年代起開始到處併購美國公司及土地，對西方世界造成一定程度的衝擊。接合了「恐日症」的「科技東方主義」（techno-orientalism）便是在此背景下誕生的。

筆者從事亞洲當代藝術交流多年，每當以「亞洲」作為主體進行論述時，多少都會收到各種批評的聲音。批評者針對建構亞洲的主體性，通常表達了其是否為某種跨國家民族主義、區域主義、甚至是大東亞／泛亞主義復辟的疑慮。但對筆者而言，「亞洲」通常是一種相對於西方的現實條件所構成的狀態；換句話說，「亞洲」通常並非依循自我建構的主動性過程而生成的，「亞洲」往往是被動地被建構而出的框架。「科技東方主義」同樣的在建構當代亞洲文化的過程中，採取了類似的策略。

和薩伊德（Edward Said）所論述的《東方主義》（Orientalism, 1978）有所不同，「科技東方主義」不僅指涉了不同的東方³，甚而對於雙方技術條件的差異也進行了某種程度上的翻轉。「東方主義」一詞原泛指十九世紀歐洲中心主義對於近東及其他亞洲地區的異國觀看。在此種異國觀看的視角下，近東在繪畫中往往被描繪為由吵雜的市集、弄蛇人、奴隸販子及妖豔裸女所構成的感官世界。此種觀看結構不僅是為了滿足十九世紀歐洲人的窺淫慾望之外，同時亦用於服務技術進步史觀。在技術進步史觀的敘述下，東方被視為某種落後的、技術上需要被援助的載體。

西方世界在開始邁入到電影創作時代之後，科幻類型片隨即成為重要的類型電影之一。然而早期的科幻片，多少都和亞洲聯結不上關係。譬如經典科幻片《大都會》（Metropolis, 1929）雖然有引用到「巴比倫」的概念，但多少還是圍繞在歐洲文學傳統中將近東譬喻為「暴政」的修辭術。高達（Jean-Luc Godard）的名作《阿爾發城》（Alphaville, 1965），則是反映法國自身在進入到冷戰現代主義體系中的焦慮。而 1977 年起開始陸續上映的《星際大戰》（Star Wars）系列，則可看到傳統的東方主義視角如何被融入到「塔圖因」（Tatooine）等宇宙中較為「落後」的星球。

3 《東方主義》以討論西方與近東的關係為主，但「科技東方主義」卻往往較為注重包括日本在內的遠東意象。

日本於戰後的泡沫經濟時代，促使美國好萊塢電影自 1980 年代起拍攝一系列和日本文化接觸及衝突的電影；其中包括了《小子難纏》（The Karate Kid, 1984）系列、《超級魔鬼幹部》（Gung Ho, 1986）、《黑雨》（Black Rain, 1989）、《棒球先生》（Mr. Baseball, 1992）及《旭日東昇》（Rising Sun, 1993）等。這些電影通常描述著美國主角迫於時勢，被迫受雇於日本上司或是處理和日本人搭檔的棘手處境。這些電影多少展現了美國主流社會當時對於日本經濟「銳實力」的恐懼，但礙於美日之間特殊的冷戰盟邦關係，劇情的發展往往從誤解、衝突轉化為對於彼此文化的尊重及信任。

處理美日大戰的當代劇或許最後總是圓滿收場，但以《銀翼殺手》（Blade Runner, 1982）為首的美國科幻電影，卻帶出了科技東方主義的視角。在電影《銀翼殺手》的描繪中，2019 年的洛杉磯已經成為了一座充滿異國色彩的反烏托邦城市。由哈里遜·福特所飾演的主角不再身處於《法櫃奇兵》中的阿拉伯市集，卻被充滿東亞文字、招牌、路人及髒亂的亞洲式路邊攤所圍繞。《銀翼殺手》的場景設定回應了 1980 年代美國的恐日症，該電影所預設的未來世界似乎已經被以日本人為主的亞洲各族裔所佔領。而這個由亞洲人所主導的未來，則是一座「High Tech, Low Life」的賽博龐克式反烏托邦。

此種對於當代日本所折射而出的賽博龐克場景，其實並非僅止出現於好萊塢電影之中。由德國導演文·溫德斯（Wim Wenders）所拍攝的紀錄片《尋找小津》（Tokyo-Ga, 1985），看似執著於對日本名導小津安二郎的致敬，但導演自身似乎更沉迷於東京街頭的科技東方主義觀看視角之中。《尋找小津》花費了大量的篇幅詳細描述「柏青哥」及高爾夫球練習場等西方人覺得十分異國的科技娛樂場景，並藉此營造一種小津電影中已不復存在的鄉愁。文·溫德斯對於日本反烏托邦場景的迷戀，再次出現於其科幻電影《直到世界末日》（Until the End of the World, 1991）之中。

這些電影轉化了對於亞洲的恐懼，創造了某種混亂和不堪的未來場景：一方面科技東方主義並不否認亞洲國家於科技、工業、資本主義領域的進步，但同時亦認為由亞洲所主導的未來世界，是一種人類生活品質倒退的反烏托邦。在沒有亞洲元素的好萊塢電影中，未來世界則通常是由明亮的城市規劃、舒適的生活空間、以及穿著俐落西裝的人們所構成。但不論是在何種敘述邏輯之下的未來世界，亞裔的身體甚少有機會成為這些電影的主角。

也因此，本屆亞洲藝術雙年展「Phantasmapolis」（2021），便是希望可以跳脫出「科技東方主義」的窠臼，來重新思考亞洲當代藝術的科幻觀點究竟為何？這不僅是傳統解殖工程的延伸，亦是希望藉此亦對「科技現代性」進行重新論述的工程。換句話說，「Phantasmapolis」所要處理的，不僅是亞洲內部面對現代性時的問題，更是要透過處理亞洲議題，來對「科技現代性」所主宰的當代世界進行進一步的除魅任務。

Phantasmapolis: Techno-Modernity and Techno-Orientalism

TAKAMORI Nobuo

What is our point of reference in discussions on the science fiction genre? In the words of American film theorist Vivian Sobchack, the sci-fi film genre "emphasizes actual, extrapolative, or speculative science and the empirical method, interacting in a social context [...]"¹ Furthermore, Sobchack believes that though sci-fi films in the American context seldom emphasize magical or religious transcendentalism, the films themselves are an "attempt to reconcile man with the unknown."² So how shall we approach discussions of science fiction in Asia? Do discursive agency and significance exist when we discuss science fiction within the constraints of Asia as a region?

By evoking Vivian Sobchack's description of the "attempt to reconcile man with the unknown" in the context of various cultures across Asia, initial associations may conjure legends and folklore in Asian cultures. Whether the Indian epic *Ramayana*, or the Chinese folklore of the *Peach Blossom Spring*, or the Japanese tale of *Urashima Tarō* -- all are narratives that connect humans with the world of the unknown. The abovementioned examples not only bring readers and audiences into a mysterious, uncharted realm, but also involve flight and escape as well as otherworldly alien spaces and temporospatial relationships.

Taken in earnest, the examples epic tales and folklore mentioned above, as well as countless other classical Asian texts, bear remarkable similarities to science fiction texts; so, what elements precludes these folk cultural narratives from science fiction? The key aspect in Occidental narratives of science fiction necessitates a connection to science. Hence, ancient Greek or Norse mythology in the Western tradition are also ruled out as possible science fiction texts. Ever since Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, (1818), science fiction texts have endeavored to process relationships between human beings and unknown technologies in the aftermath of the scientific and industrial revolutions.

In other words, for those in the West, science fiction texts are rooted in Occidental techno-modernity. This techno-modernity not only imagines the historical time trajectory to be progressive, but also a "progress" versus "regression" binary opposition determined by society's ability to harness modern technology and science. We can also deduce that in the techno-modernity perspective, "modernity" is not limited to a temporal condition, but a "technology/skill" issue where modernity equals that which is "scientific" and "technological."

As such, in the progressive view of history under techno-modernity, the world-at-large beyond Europe and the Americas has been regarded since the 19th century as passive receivers of techno-modernity. Which is to say, as far as developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are concerned, their path to modernization is limited to constantly absorbing and acquiring Western science and technological knowledge. They can only "catch up" to the Western world and accomplish their own internal modernization in this manner. In other words, the vast regions external to the Western world have long been designated as consumers of modern technologies and expertise, and not as its producers and creators. These stereotypes and prejudices have been vigorously contested since the Cold War.

1 Sobchack, V., *Screening Space: The American Science Fiction Film* (2nd ed.) (New York: The Ungar Publishing Company, 1980), 63.

2 Ibid.

Seismic shifts in the global economy during the Cold War gave rise to a burgeoning group of developed countries and a robust economic/technological complex on the Asian continent which began with the rise of the Japanese economy in the 1970s and '80s culminating in the peak of the Japanese bubble economy of the 1980s. This was followed by the emergence of the Four Asian Tigers from the 1970s through 1980s, which saw the formation of an affluent economic corridor comprising South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The third wave of economic development in Asia, from the 1990s through the 2000s, revolved around China and, in the 2010s, pivoted toward emerging markets in India and Southeast Asia.

Technological breakthroughs that accompanied this rapid economic development upended 19th century global structures. For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, breakthroughs in technological fields and applied engineering successively occurred in the non-Western world. These breakthroughs naturally caused qualitative changes in the creation of science fiction texts. The 1984 Summer Olympics in Tokyo and the 1970 World Expo in Osaka were not only the first major events to be held in Japan, but also marked the first time that international events of a grand scale were hosted in Asia. To showcase the results of their modernization, Japan constructed modern infrastructure such as the Shuto Expressway, as well as invested in the world's first practical high-speed rail system, the Shinkansen.

Japan changed the global industrial structure with its technological and capital ascendancy. In addition to high-tech capital industries such as consumer electronics and automobiles, in which Japanese products held an indisputable advantage, Japanese capitalists also began purchasing American companies and land throughout the 1980s, which generated a certain level of shock to the Western world. It was against this backdrop that an amalgamation of Japanophobia with techno-Orientalism was born.

In the author's years of engagement with contemporary art exchanges in Asia, any discussions with "Asia" as a subject of focus would elicit immediate critique on whether the construct of an Asian subjectivity implied a certain transnational nationalism, regionalism, or perhaps a greater East Asian/Pan-Asian restoration of power. However, "Asia" for the author more often designated a state of reality constructed in response to Western conditions of reality. In other words, "Asia" is rarely generated through an active process of self-construction, but is a passively constructed framework. In the process of constructing a contemporary Asian culture, techno-Orientalism has adopted a similar strategy.

Unlike the *Orientalism* (1978) defined by Edward Said, techno-Orientalism not only refers to an Orient³ of difference, but also to technological conditions that exist between the two sides, which have been reversed to a degree. The term "Orientalism" evokes the 19th century Eurocentric exotification of the Near East and other Asian regions. From this exotified perspective, the Near East is often depicted in paintings as a sensual world constructed through cacophonous bazaars, snake charmers, slave traders, and coquettish nudes. This viewing structure not only satiated the voyeuristic desires of 19th century Europeans, but also served the historical perspective of technological progress. Under the historical narrative of technological progress, the East was regarded as an underdeveloped entity that required technological assistance.

3 *Orientalism* was primarily a discussion on the relationship between the West and the Near East, whereas the emphasis of "techno-Orientalism" is more often on the Far East encompassing Japan.

As the Western world entered into the cinematic era, sci-fi films became a primary genre. Early sci-fi films had little to do with Asia. For example, though "Babylon" appears as a concept in the sci-fi classic *Metropolis* (1929), the allusion revolved for the most part around the rhetorical metaphor of "tyranny" in the European literary tradition. Jean-Luc Godard's masterpiece, *Alphaville* (1965), was a reflection of French anxiety upon entry into the Cold War modernist system. The *Star Wars* series that began in 1977 offered a glimpse of traditional Orientalist perspectives as integrated into the Tatooine and other "less advanced" planets in the Universe.

Japan's post war bubble economy prompted a series of Hollywood films in the 1980s that depicted contact and conflict with Japanese culture. These included *The Karate Kid* (1984) series, *Gung Ho* (1986), *Black Rain* (1989), *Mr. Baseball* (1992), and *Rising Sun* (1993), etc. These films typically depicted an American protagonist compelled by circumstance into troublesome situations requiring them to work for Japanese employers, or alongside Japanese partners. These films revealed underlying fears of the Japanese economic "sharp power" that gripped American mainstream society at the time, but which were tempered by the curious Cold War alliance between Japan and the United States, the plot development typically evolved from situations of misunderstanding and conflict toward a mutual respect and trust for the other's culture.

Contemporary dramas that dealt with the US-Japan war might have reached a happy resolution, but the American sci-fi films spearheaded by *Blade Runner* (1982) precipitated a techno-Orientalism perspective. *Blade Runner* depicted Los Angeles in 2019 as an exotic dystopian city. No longer located in the Arabian bazaars of *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, protagonist Harrison Ford was, instead, mired in a world with East Asian script on billboards, crowded with pedestrians and chaotic Asian-style street stalls. The setting of *Blade Runner* responded to the Japanophobia of 1980s United States by projecting a future world in the film occupied by predominantly Japanese Asian ethnic groups; and this Asian-dominated future was portrayed as a "high tech, low life," cyberpunk dystopia.

This cyberpunk scenario as a reflection of contemporary Japan did not only appear in Hollywood films. In the documentary *Tokyo-Ga* (1985), German filmmaker Wim Wenders ostensibly paid dedicated homage to renowned Japanese filmmaker Yasujiro Ozu, but was himself mesmerized with a techno-Orientalist perspective of Tokyo's streets. An inordinate amount of footage in *Tokyo-Ga* was devoted to creating a sense nostalgia that no longer existed in Ozu's films by detailing scenes of technological entertainment, such as pachinko parlors and golf driving ranges, that Western viewers find exotic. Wim Wenders's infatuation with the dystopian Japanese scenario reappeared in his work *Until the End of the World* (1991).

These films transformed the fear of the Asian into the formation of a certain chaotic and unspeakable future scenario. Though techno-Orientalism does not negate technological, industrial, and capitalist advancements in Asian countries, it presupposes a future world dominated by Asia to be a dystopia marked by regression in the quality of human lives. The world of the future in Hollywood films without Asian elements, is often constructed through shining cities, comfortable living spaces, and people in stylish Western-style clothing. Regardless of the narrative logic, Asian bodies rarely have opportunities to become protagonists in these cinematic future worlds.

Hence, the current "Asian Art Biennial," "Phantasmapolis" (2021), hopes to break from techno-Orientalism tropes to re-contemplate a science fiction perspective in Asian contemporary art. This is not only an extension of a traditional decolonization deconstructionist project, but also a project that hopes to undertake a redefinition of techno-modernity. In other words, what "Phantasmapolis" will confront are not only internal issues of modernity in Asia, but also a further disenchantment of a contemporary world dominated by techno-modernity through Asian issues.