一種正義，各自表述：
時間、檔案、書寫

One Justice, Each to Its Own: Time, Archive, and Writing

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摘要

　　論文以《檔案熱》一書爲基礎，解釋如何在解構主義的框架卜思考正義，探其衍生之相關議題，更進一步討論如何在各種以身分或群體之名開啓（官方視野之外）的另類、底層或邊緣等歷史視野的眾聲喧嘩中，爲德希德的檔案理論做協調與定位。例如，許多學者指出，將法文書名*Mal d'archive*譯爲*Archive Fever*或《檔案熱》有不妥之處，容易與其他學科的檔案轉向混淆，若此「熱」非彼「熱」，如何爲前者含帶「惡」之意涵的疾病隱喻與後者同時具有「蔚爲風潮」與「具體參與之熱忱」的概念進行協商將會是本文的重點提問。本文以舞鶴的小說《餘生》爲例，探討《餘生》如何透過所謂的「當代觀點」解構官方（或漢人中心主義）對霧社事件的歷史定位，並如何以餘生倫理學書寫劫後餘生的存在經驗；《餘生》對霧社事件歷史書寫的問題化過程指向一種類似德希達口中的困境式的經驗，然而其餘生倫理學雖回應了「絕對他者」的招喚，但面對歷史他者的哀嚎卻也顯得無奈與無助，讓我們間接看見德希達檔案理論能產生的巨大思考能量與可能面對的歷史情境之難題。

關鍵字：臺灣美術研究、臺灣史、美術運動

壹、解構的正義

德希達在《檔案熱》（*Mal d'archive; Archive Fever*）曾言，一個關於檔案的科學必須包含檔案體制化的理論，即法律如何銘刻與權力如何賦權檔案的理論。因此，他在書中一開始便宣稱沒有任何一個政治權力不針對檔案進行掌控。[1]當權者透過對歷史與記憶的篩選、排列、與重組不僅能杜撰一套對過去歷史蓋棺定論的論述，也能有效正當化既有體制，更能操控整個社會對未來的想像。換句話說，檔案化的過程除了是對過往事蹟的複製保存，檔案建構的同時也涉及權力與暴力的行使。因此，檔案化的過程只有不同型態與不同程度的權力彰顯，沒有所謂權力真空下客觀、純真或無辜的檔案（innocent archives）。

檔案的建構涉及權力與暴力的論點不算新穎，也不是德希達的檔案論述中最令人驚豔的見解。德希達的檔案理論真正的創見在於他拒絕將檔案放在以考古學為隱喻的框架下論述，拒絕將檔案的功能單純地定位在為被遺忘的邊緣歷史發聲，發掘不被重視與不被看見的塵封往事；因此，對德希達而言，檔案不是一種發掘真實的媒介，他不願用補償或補足的邏輯（the compensatory or restorative logic）思考檔案作為實踐正義的手段。事實上，經過後結構洗禮後的歷史書寫很難再將歷史書寫定位為對真實的再現。除了德希達外，德賽圖（Michel de Certeau）等歷史學家也不斷提醒我們，歷史的書寫與檔案的建構不是超然客觀的活動，研究者本身的發聲位置（the enunciative position）、存在的歷史脈絡、研究的機構與資金、科技的進展、社會的氛圍、乃至研究者與被研究對象之間產生的移情作用（the transferential relation）均須被納入考量；歷史學研究因此被注入自反性（reflexivity），研究的目光也從知識的發掘移轉到知識的生產過程。[2]

對其它的歷史學者或投身社會運動的人士而言，德希達的看法具相當大的爭議，似乎影射解構主義對檔案的思考隱藏對正義的冷漠，甚至不視。然而，德希達拒絕將檔案視為對歷史真實的挖掘不代表他對檔案的思考無關正義。對德希達而言，正義的追求是提供解構運作的養分，甚至整個哲學思考的本質是某種創傷性遭遇。如他在一次訪談中提到，哲學必須反覆處理創傷狀態（traumatism），憶起被遺忘的創傷（an anamnesis of the forgetting），同時也不讓自身被創傷擊敗。[3]對德希達而言，解構的正義即是上述創傷性的遭遇，而他對檔案或檔案化過程（archivization）的思考則提供我們一個體現或實踐（非實現）正義的管道。

德希達認為，正義無關遲來或已到。他賦予正義一種彌賽亞式「將一至」（*à venir*）的時間觀，因此不能以遲來的正義等法之伸張或情感之慰藉為基礎，理解解構式的正義。事實上，德希達視正義與法律為兩種不同層次的範疇，兩者的關係因此需被理解為不同層次的交疊。法律不是達到正義的手段，正義也不是法律的終極伸張；一方面，法律與正義的關係長期以來都含帶某種交易邏輯或某種認可與目的，從一報還一報到正義為法律線性之因果延伸都是在此框架內的思維；另一方

1.Derrida Jacques, *Archive Fever*, trans., Eric Prenowitz, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. p.4.

2.關於後結構主義歷史學研究，參見Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*或Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*。

3.*Derrida Jacques, Points... Interviews, 1974-1994*, Trans., Peggy Kamuf, et al. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p.382.

面，解構的正義超越且先於交易、循環、認可、算計與規則，挑戰法的基礎同時也為法帶入變異的動能，使之成為法的運作之可能性與不可能性之條件：「『如此的正義』德希達解釋，『不同與法，是解構作用於法律或法史，政治史與歷史本身的運動』」。[4]

德希達在諸多場合表示，正義是無法解構的（undeconstructible），或，解構本身即為正義（deconstruction is justice），因為解構的精神是致力於突顯正義所指向的困境式（the aporetic）經驗。[5] 在德希達的思想中，諸多重要的概念都與正義所揭露的困境有本質上的相連，從早期分析語言與文本的延異（différance）與痕跡（trace）至中後期較具政治性的概念如友愛（friendship）、自體免疫（autoimmunity）與彌賽亞性（messianicity），這些解構主義的關鍵字無不將主體（subject）或主權（sovereignty）等等封閉、自我指涉與自我完滿的想像暴露於一種內蘊自發的深沉矛盾—從無關係的關係 (non-relational relation)、無邏輯的邏輯（illogical logic）、乃至無彌賽亞主義的彌賽亞性（messianicity without messianism），指向的都是一種困境、創傷或與「不可能經驗」的遭遇（the experience of the impossible），再再顯示在場形上學於其本源「總是已經」（always already）殘缺與分裂。

值得注意的是，我們需避免一般對解構的認知，認為解構的動作單純以破壞為志業。解構一詞源自海德格對形上學觀念的「拆構」（Destruktion）。因字面意義的關係，解構的運作常被約化為破壞性之舉。但無論是海德格的Destruktion或德希達的deconstruction，兩者在哲學層次被賦予的內涵都不能單純地被理解為負性的拆解，忽略內部另一個形構的面向。德希達不斷提醒我們，解構是雙向的動作，在毀滅、消除、拆解的過程同時帶有肯定與創造的效應，因此形成上述所謂的困境式經驗。更進一步釐清，我們也須解構區別於所謂的創造性破壞（creative destruction）。創造性的破壞依舊帶有線性進程的意味，是破壞之後的重生與再造，如此無法精確地捕抓困境式經驗的特異時間性。或許，我們可以說，唯有在非常確切的條件下，我們才能將解構理解為創造性破壞，而這個條件是：破壞與重生是在更密切的相互指涉、相互形構、相離相斥卻有相形相生的關係中不斷角力，解構的時間無關先來後至，毀滅與創造兩者在本體層次「總是已經」陷入一種無可避免的糾雜困境。

解構式的破壞因此導向一個弔詭的邏輯，從本體論（ontology）到幽靈學（hauntology），解構主義對本體在場的脫位與架空，使被解構對象在現象層次以無法預期的型態無盡蛻變。如此理解，解構的運作也可以被看成一種肯定的（affirmative）機制，它拆毀停滯不變的體制時，但帶來的不是毀滅，而是解放性的變異之效：

解構不是一種發覺抵抗系統的方法；它是在閱讀與詮釋文本時的重新標記，標示哲學家們建

4.Derrida Jacques, "Fore of Law", *Acts of Religion*, ed., Gil Anidjar, trans., Mary Quaintance, New York: Routledge, 2002, p.254.

5.見 "Force of Law" 頁243，特別是德希達稱聲「解構即正義」後對解構、正義、法律提出的三點主張：（一）法律可以解構；（二）正義無法解構；（三）解構的位置在兩者間際之處。關於Derrida對正義的闡述，亦見《馬克思的幽靈》與收入於*Acts of Religion*的另一篇文章 "Faith and Knowledge"。

構一個體系時所依賴的無非是某種失衡或失率，某種對系統封閉的無能爲力。每當我採用此調查方法，[我的]提問總是揭露系統的無法運作，這種失衡不僅破壞該系統，更解釋了邁向系統的欲望，其離崩與分裂提供趨向系統的生命能量。[6]

因此我們可以說，困境與危機雖使系統封閉與自我完滿不可能，但危機也是轉機，它使隱含同質、整體等封閉想像的個體概念暴露於內存的他異性（Other），這種經驗爲自我帶來的延異之效，使流變與創新得以可能，也賦予解構一個開放性未來的時間觀，一種「將—至」卻永不至的彌賽雅或幽靈時間觀。這種時間觀是對未來的開啓，「不含期待的視野與預塑……如他者或死亡突如其來當下的驚訝」。[7]

貳、檔案熱

我問自己什麼是眞正屬於檔案的時刻……嚴格來講屬於檔案化當下的時刻，那不是現場、立即的回憶，而是在某種科技基礎上增能補助的經驗。

德希達，《檔案熱》[8]

德希達在不同時期，不同脈絡，面對不同的分析對象，使用不同的詞彙論述解構即正義之命題，雖然這些概念彼此因時空脈絡的不同有些微差異，不能被等同視之，但如上述所言，它們卻也相同的指向危險卻具解放性的困境式經驗。同樣地，我們也可以將德希達在《檔案熱》所提出的「普遍性的檔案學」（a project of general archivology）看成解構主義開啓並且實踐正義的其中一個路徑。

德希達指出，檔案的本質矛盾且分裂，同時具備『創立與保守，革命與傳統』的特質。[9]檔案包含兩個面向：檔案化過程不僅含有發掘並保存（過去被遺忘或壓抑的）歷史之欲望（the archival desire），檔案化過程同時隱藏另一股朝向遺忘與毀滅的驅力。這兩股相互消解的驅力共存於檔案化過程中——即，檔案化過程在保存的同時謀殺欲保存之物，秩序建立的同時也埋下了安那其的種子（an-archive）；因此，保存也是失去的開始。這股朝向遺忘的驅力被德希達視爲檔案建構保存的過程中，另一個「沈默的使命」。[10]換句話說，檔案化過程體現德希達在它處所稱的「自體免疫」邏輯（the autoimmune logic）。

在生物學中，自體免疫指生物有機體的免疫系統之錯亂導致的一種反噬現象。抗體（antibodies）的功能是保護身體對抗如病毒等外來抗原（antigens）；然而，在某情況下，抗體反應產生錯亂，反而攻擊自身器官與組織。德希達認爲，在其它場域也能觀察到如生物學中的自體免疫

6.Derrida Jacques, *A Taste for the Secret*, Trans. Giacomo Donis, Malden, MA: Polity, 2001,p.4.

7.Derrida Jacques, "Faith and Knowledge," *Acts of Religion*, ed., Gil Anidjar, trans., Samuel Weber, New York: Routledge, 2002, 40-101, p.56.

8.Derrida Jacques, *Archive Fever*, op. cit.

9.同上註，頁7。

10.同上註，頁9。

現象。[11]若將生物學領域觀察的現象進一步延伸，放在檔案化脈絡討論，我們發現檔案化的過程也依循相同的自體免疫邏輯，如德希達所言：「檔案的運作總是且先存地傷其自身」。[12]

舉例來說，在*Geneses, Genealogies, Genres and Genius*書中，德希達談及摯友愛蓮・西蘇（Hélène Cixous）檔案被安置在法國國家圖書館（BNF，the Bibliotheque Nationale de France）一事。國家圖書館屬於具宰制力量的公共空間，西蘇的捐贈（禮物）除了豐富了圖書館的收藏外，對圖書管內分門別類的秩序也造成一種危險。Martin McQuillan指出，西蘇的作品無法被分類，她的文本比收納的圖書館更加弘大，是圖書館分門別類的秩序中無法收編的份子，因此打亂了圖書的索引結構，也印證德希達所說的檔案內部朝向破壞與遺忘的驅力。[13]

類似的例子在網路的時代以諸多不同的形態出現。以日常生活中檔案備份為例，紀捷克（Slavoj Žižek）有一個名為「互卸性」（interpassivity）的概念，這不是德希達檔案理論脈絡下討論的概念，但我們可以引用紀捷克依此概念衍生出的例子印證德希達的論點。紀捷克指出，早期當VCR這種影音紀錄的媒介出現後，許多人（包括他自己）會用VCR側錄電視播放的影片，當VCR錄製影片的同時，使用者（因事務繁忙等理由）並沒有同時觀看影片，而是讓VCR幫他們做「看電影」的這個動作，當VCR錄製完成形成一個檔案後，使用者也會感到非常地滿足，彷彿他們已經享受過看影片的樂趣。VCR檔案化的過程因而產生極為矛盾的現象：「**擁有一台VCR的立即效應便是，跟過去僅有電視機的美好年代相比，我們實際上看了更少的電影**」。[14]紀捷克的重點當然是主體被動與客體主動的弔詭現象，但這個例子也揭露媒體紀錄時產生類似自體免疫的邏輯：檔案記錄的同時也內存一股朝向遺忘或毀滅的驅力；VCR紀錄的同時讓使用者產生一種心態，因為這些影片已經很安全地被儲存於VCR媒介內，因此使用者也可以很安逸地遺忘這些影片。此案例揭露日常生活中檔案化的普遍現象——當檔案越安全地被儲存時（例如多重備份），使用者也能更放心地遺忘這些檔案（例如不去使用或無期限拖延至未來再使用等等）。[15]

這意味著所有的檔案都有雙重功能：首先是一般熟悉的檔案化工程，意圖將記憶、書寫、或過往事蹟安全地保存。德希達指出，檔案蘊含希臘文*arkhē*的概念，此概念協調兩個原則，一種是自然與歷史的起始（commencement），另一種是法律的命令（commandment）。在*arkhē*的概念中，「順序」與「命令」兩種秩序的結合意味著檔案紀錄事件的起始或順序是在司法場域下的運作。[16]這點透過檔案一詞希臘字源*arkheion*的分析更加明顯。*Arkheion*指古希臘城邦地方執政官（archon）的住所，這些擁有政治權力的市民也被認為擁有制定與代表法律的權力，官方文件存放在他們的住所內，這些地方執法官也成為文件的守護者；他們不只確保住所內文件安全無慮，他們也被賦予

11. Derrida Jacques, "Faith and Knowledge," *Acts of Religion*, Ed., Gil Anidjar, Trans., Samuel Weber, New York: Routledge, 2002. pp.27, 80.
12. 同上註，頁12。
13. 見McQuillan為此書撰寫的前言。
14. Zizek, Slavoj, *How to Read Lacan*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2007,p.24.
15. 「遺忘的權利」（the right to be forgotten）是另一個值得探討的例子：大數據不斷收集資訊，經過挑選、排列、關鍵字組合，使得某些人的身份不斷與過去某件事件連結，對他們而言，記憶成為揮之不去的夢魘與生命不可承受的重，因此有另一種聲音出現，一種要求被遺忘的權利，似乎也體現檔案結構內自我抹滅的死亡驅力。
16. Zizek, Slavoj, *How to Read Lacan*, op. cit, p.1.

詮釋文件的權力與能力，這是所謂的「委託」（consignation）之功能，一種符號聚集的原則（the gathering together of signs），統合地點（*topos*）與律法（*nomos*），讓保管檔案的場所同時也擁有指派（assign）、辨識、歸類、統合等權力，使檔案形成一個封閉的系統與共時的整體。因此這些文件不只是檔案物件，在它們的身上我們也看到法律的招喚。[1]德希達稱這種委託功能爲檔案（或保存）驅力（archive or conservation drive），實踐保存正義的同時不可避免地會對值得保存與不值得保存的內容做選擇，因此保存、增編、或納入的過程同時也涉及內外界限的劃定，使其暴露於排他性的機制之中，此舉不僅爲檔案化的過程帶入一個政治面向，也使檔案因選擇的條件之差異成爲有限性的紀錄。

德希達在上述對檔案希臘字源的分析強調檔案的有形存在（physical presence），除了標記空間場域與行使權力的特定人士外，他也強調檔案驅力有一種望向過去的時間觀，保存自然或歷史事件引發的序列組合，使其不受時間的摧殘而消逝。

的確，檔案存在的目的是保存記憶，然而檔案作爲輔助性媒介，保存記憶的同時也讓記憶失了眞。德希達區分兩種不同型態的記憶：第一種是內在、現場、立即的回憶（*anamnesis*）；第二種是透過媒介（書寫、印刷、電子信件或其他科技輔助品等）的外在輔助性回憶／異（*hypomnēma*）。檔案慾望是捕抓並保存即刻、在場、無失眞的原初回憶。然而，檔案作爲媒介的形式不可避免地帶進外部的介入——意味著檔案在保存記憶時，對被保存物的銘刻，亦可被視爲一種生產之舉，因爲媒介的差異與介入「總是已經」讓原始內容物夾雜異質痕跡：「檔案是增能補助的回憶／異（hypomnesic）……每個檔案均被委託至一個外在場所，在該處確認記憶、重複、複製或重印的可能性，那我們也須謹記，重複本身、重複的邏輯，即強迫性重複（the repetition compulsion），根據佛洛伊德説法，與死亡驅力無法區別，因此與毀滅也無法區別」。[18]有鑑於此，歷史的眞實不斷因檔案科技的創新重複生成，也因此不斷產生變異。

簡單來說，檔案化過程涉及保存方式的差異，德希達認爲「可檔案化的內容」（archivable content）會因科技發展程度之不同而改變；不同時期會因科技發展之差異、保存技術的演變、或研究方法學的改變影響紀錄與保存方式；更甚者，檔案化結構（the archiving structure）的不同不僅會影響檔案保存的方式，甚至能決定能被保存的檔案物內容爲何：「檔案，如印刷，書寫，義肢，或一般增補記憶的技術不僅是儲存與保存過去可以檔案化內容之場所……不，檔案化技術的結構也決定可被檔案化的內容之結構……檔案化如同紀錄事件般生產事件。這也是我們之於所謂新媒體的政治經驗」。[19]科技的演變因此在結構層次產生另一種界線的劃定，即政治的經驗，使關乎未來的不確定性滲入檔案建構的過程中，也讓檔案成爲不穩定且有限性的建構。[20]

如果檔案是有限性的建構，其侷限來自兩種不同因素：第一個原因來是地方執政官對檔案行使委託權時的選擇，例如哪些文件可被歸檔保存，供未來子孫閱讀，哪些需要被排除在外，這樣的選

17.同註8，頁2-3。.
18.同註8，頁11-12。
19.同註8，頁16-17。
20.同註8，頁16-17。

擇使檔案的完整與全面不可能，因此構成檔案的有限性（finitude）。有限性第二個成因來自上述保存技術的演變，檔案化結構的差異除了會影響可檔案化的內容外，檔案也會經歷不斷地複製與銘刻，不斷交錯疊層的重複生產；這種重複不是機械式一成不變的重複（the mechanical repetition of the same），而是一種具解構效應的「重異性」（iterability），重複同時產生差異。[21]因此，記憶被保存的同時也因輔助性媒介而不完整，不斷撤離、分裂與自我異化，徒留痕跡斑斑，不見立即與生動的回憶。這也是為什麼德希達稱聲：「檔案……不會是內部自發與現場的記憶或回憶。想反地，檔案發生在上述記憶原初與結構性的崩壞處」。[22]

德希達將這股朝向遺忘的驅力命名為檔案熱（或檔案之惡），是檔案內存的矛盾，同時是檔案驅力的可能性與不可能性之條件：「沒有此惡，即檔案熱，檔案的慾望與失序，也不會有指派與委託」。[23]他借用佛洛伊德精神分析的概念「死亡驅力」（the death drive）論述檔案內部的無意識，將這股朝向毀滅歸無的力量提高為檔案保存無法泯除的內存有限性（finitude）。弔詭的是，因為檔案內存的有限性使得保守的檔案慾望與消泯的死亡驅力兩者進入無限的困境式循環，檔案的欲望因死亡驅力如幽靈般無止境的復返無法獲得完滿，但也如此而持續地不斷生成。如同上述德希達描述解構與結構的關係，檔案內部存有相同的矛盾，體制封閉的不可能也是體制蛻變與再生的可能性條件，如此幽靈邏輯，使歷史的回歸或記憶的在場不可能，但也因受到內存的不可能性驅使，檔案驅力才能夠持續不斷增生，形成一波接一波的檔案建構熱潮（passion）。

整體而言，德希達論述檔案時，強調的是檔案化過程由兩股互相排斥卻非單純對立的驅力在檔案化過程內部形成的困境式經驗。[24] 這兩股驅力賦予檔案一種奇特的時間性，使檔案化過程同時朝向過去與未來，記錄過去的同時也開啟一個不定的未來。他將具解放性的困境式經驗與在《馬克思的幽靈》（Specters of Marx）對彌賽亞性的闡述做連結，強調幽魂式的檔案結構超越在場與不在場的二元劃分，超越過去、現在、未來的分野，是對意義的在場（presence）與存在的顯現（being as presence）之懸置。

幽魂是一種特異的存在，介於有／無、存在／不存、生／死、實／虛、在場／缺席的臨界空隙（liminal space），先於上述種種二元劃分，成為它們的（不）可能性條件[25]。德希達強調：「一種幽魂式的彌賽亞性在檔案的概念中運作，將它與……承諾的特異經驗聯繫」。[26] 承諾的特異經驗（the singular experience of the promise）是與創傷的遭遇，也是與「不可能的經驗」（the experience of the impossible）的遭遇，是一種現在對過去無法不去承擔的承諾，卻也無法實現的承諾，因無法實現只能透過實踐於未來不斷回返。這種經驗也是所謂解構的正義——正義不是一種補償，而是一

21.同上註，頁90。
22.同上註，頁11。
23.同上註，頁81。
24.Martin Haägglund也提醒我們，免疫與自體免疫邏輯被挪用至生物學場域外後，特別在政治場域，會引發兩種截然不同的政治意涵，身份或共同體的形成依賴的是免疫的邏輯，而自體免疫邏輯指涉的是『將－到』的開放性未來：兩者看似大相逕庭，但絕不能被視為非黑即白的對立面（"Autoimmunity of Religion"頁195）。正義與法律的關係亦然，雖然兩者有顯著差異，但德希達強調的是在困境式經驗中對兩者協商的要求，非兩者的對立面向。關於此點，參見"Force of Law"，頁251。
25.同註8，頁84。
26.同註8，頁36。

種承諾，是現在對過去不公義的回憶之承諾，也是現在對未來書寫正義的承諾。正義不是一種狀態，正義是一種作爲（doing），但這種作沒有可依循的藍圖，也沒有規劃好的路徑，更不是在可預期的未來實現一個想像的烏托邦，而是在檔案（archive）與安那其化的檔案（an-archive）的間隙之間，協商兩者的衝突與流變；這個間隙之間是正義的所在處，孕育未來「將—至」（to come）的發生地。德希達曾言，我們能很有自信地說自己是合法的，但我們卻無法確定自己是正義的（I am just）；[27] 也因如此，正義的不確定性（indeterminate）促使我們不斷地承受遭遇他者的責任。[28] 從這個角度詮釋，解構的正義是一種肯定的作爲，如果記憶的埋沒、缺席與不見驅使著檔案發掘的熱情，使過往塵封的檔案得以撥雲見日，但檔案的重新排列與整理除了帶來對歷史詮釋的新契機，也伴隨歷史再度僵化的封閉危機；所謂「檔案熱」的正義在這兩端遊走，承諾對過去（不公義）的持續關注，但也持續鬆動檔案化後可能併發的僵化效應。

　　與傳統將檔案與過去連結的觀點不同，德希達認爲檔案的問題也攸關未來。關於檔案與未來的關係，我們必須先強調德希達在論述調性上的一個顯著改變：從一開始以具體的空間與權力形式定義檔案「分配」（assignation）與「交付」（consignation）等功能，所強調的是檔案有形存在的空間性（如檔案存放的住所位置）與執政官（archon）如何對過去行使司法與政治的權力；但隨後將檔案理論放置在精神分析死亡驅力的論述討論時，檔案原本的具體形象被幽靈化，時間觀也從過去導向「將—至」的開放性未來，以不確定性（indeterminate）的激進時間觀爲朝向秩序、穩定、不變的檔案驅力注入重異性的變革。[29]

　　佛洛伊德精神分析提供德希達思考檔案的基礎。從解構的觀點，檔案熱指的是檔案結構表現出的自體免疫邏輯，意味著記憶的抹滅並非外在或後至的威脅，而是先存（*a priori*）於檔案結構內的創傷。但是將法文書名*Mal d'archive*譯爲*Archive Fever*或《檔案熱》引起一些爭議，容易與其他學科的檔案轉向混淆，若此「熱」非彼「熱」，如何爲前者含帶「惡」之意涵的疾病隱喻與後者同時具有「蔚爲風潮」與「具體參與之熱忱」的概念進行協商成爲一個重要的課題。

　　一些評論者認爲德希達的檔案論過於抽象與籠統，沒有考慮檔案使用者的切身經驗。Carolyn Steedman指出，閱讀德希達《檔案熱》後，她對書中討論的檔案卻是全然陌生，與自已長期從事與認知的檔案工作大相逕庭（1159-1163, passim）。哲學家將檔案作爲隱喻（archive as metaphor）與檔案作爲具體實踐（archive as practice）之間似乎仍有一段無法跨越的距離。另外，德希達雖然解構檔案與權力的關係，藉此鬆動權力對檔案的支配，爲檔案化過程注入一個開放性的未來時間觀，但他採取的解構方法學是一種在本體層次上的批判，指向檔案內存無法避免的侷限；此舉雖然激進且具警惕之效，但本體層次上的批判擁有先制（preemptive）性的特質，且對任何檔案的建構一體適用，無法顧及特殊歷史情境、眾多不同的發聲位置與之間不平等的權力關係。因此，許多人認爲除了解構的方式外，透過書寫新檔案爲過去被噤聲或遺忘的歷史做見證，或許是另一種挑戰官方對檔案的

27.見 "Force of Law"，頁245的討論。

28.德希達口中的「他者」並非自我與他者對立框架下的一端：解構主義的他者指涉的是一種更深層，更先於自我與他者分野前的異質性，這種異質性源自本體的自我差異（self-fissuring）：於我異／溢於我。

29.Boulter Jonathan, *Melancholy and the Archive*, New York: Continuum, 2011, p.5.

論述霸權更具體也更有效的方式。此外，檔案也是在現象層次的具體存在，新媒體出現帶來的政治經驗不能局限德希達所談論的檔案化結構的改變，新媒體同時也普及化檔案紀錄的模式，使越來越多人能更多的平台挑戰官方對檔案詮釋權的壟斷。這些動作不是單純以個體或團體經驗之名發掘某種更可靠的歷史眞實，更重要的是，這些動作是主體追求正義的反抗的姿態；透過民主化檔案的詮釋權，將檔案從傳統守護者的寡頭壟斷推向眾聲喧嘩之境，這種形態的檔案熱指的是親身參與檔案的建構，透過新的知識生產作爲主體行動與再造的過程，強調的是檔案作爲一個公共分享的空間與民主化的場域。[30]

　　這兩種對檔案熱不同的詮釋，其中政治與倫理性的拉扯，在舞鶴的小說《餘生》獲得文學上的延展，因此本文最後以《餘生》爲例，簡短地探討《餘生》如何透過所謂的「當代觀點」解構官方（或漢人中心主義）對霧社事件的歷史定位，並如何以餘生倫理學書寫劫後餘生的存在經驗。[31]

參、餘生的倫理學

> 『妳曾經有過那樣最好的經驗嗎？』姑娘低頭劃地好久，『沒有，沒有一次眞正有夠，但我相信有像大洪水的流、大火山的爆，那才值得生命過一生，』……我也相信有，但那是人類已經失落了的悲傷……問題眞的有那樣『大洪水流、大火山爆』的性極境嗎，在我的人生路途上我也幾度質疑，在我餘生之時我仍不知這問題的『眞實』是什麼，並不一定需要答案，只期望生命顯示眞實而不是草草應付人生，漸漸的內在要自己不特別期望什麼，來到的用心體會如是而已……這種肉慾性慾的原始眞實竟只能靠『以心會心』來溝通了解，這不也是一種生命的荒謬，人生的悲傷嗎？
>
> 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　舞鶴，《餘生》[32]

　　舞鶴的《餘生》是一部關於敘述者與川中島居民如何面對劫後餘生的小說。小說背後探究的歷史背景爲發生在日治時期的霧社事件，但是《餘生》與過去處理霧社事件的文學文本有極爲顯著的差異。白瑞文（Michael Berry）在《痛史》（*A History of Pain*）分析「霧社事件」二戰後在臺灣的歷史定位與文學再現時，指出大中國意識形態的作家普遍定義霧社事件爲國族抵抗論述，更將莫那魯道的英雄事蹟置於中國的先烈先賢系譜，藉此收編霧社事件，使其成爲中國歷史洪流中一部可歌可泣的血淚史；之後的本土論述將臺灣史視爲一連串的抵抗歷史，同樣將霧社事件納入本土史觀，讓霧社事件的反殖民抗爭呼應臺灣人對抗國民黨威權體制的反殖民精神，此舉強化臺灣人與原住民

30.見Stoler，"Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance"；Marlene Manoff，"Theories of the Archive from Across the Disciplines"；Ariella Azoulay，"Archive"。對經驗的批判，見Scott，"The Evidence of Experience"。

31.以下對《餘生》的討論非全面性，僅選擇性地將小說幾個重點放置德希達檔案的脈絡下討論。筆者另一篇論文"Untimely Meditations: The Contemporary, the Philosophy of Walking, and Other Related Matters in Wu He's *Remains of Life*"（即將發行，收錄於Michael Berry編輯關於霧社事件的論文集*Musha 1930*）對《餘生》的倫理議題有更詳盡的著墨。另外，陳春燕的論文"Being-in-Common in Postcolonial Taiwan"也非常值得參考，該文以《餘生》爲例，闡述儂曦（Jean-Luc Nancy）本體政治觀點，試圖爲後殖民臺灣開啓一種認同身份政治之外的可能性。

32.舞鶴，《餘生》，臺北，麥田，1999年。

相同被宰制的弱勢地位，但同時也讓被壓迫者的光譜過於延展，而導致模糊失焦，忽略漢人整體對原住民的霸權與剝削。文學作爲檔案與權力密不可分的關係由此可見，直到舞鶴的《餘生》，霧社事件於文學場域的檔案化過程才獲得批判性的解構與揭露。[33]

　　首先，關於霧社事件歷史眞實的探討並非小說的重點，小說雖然對霧社事件的政治性或儀式性詮釋提出辯證式的質疑，但目的並非在質疑後爲霧社事件提出一個蓋棺定論關於歷史眞實的論點。事實上，敘述者提醒讀者，沒有所謂歷史的眞實，小說對霧社事件調查之總總均在「想像的眞實」的框架下進行。[34]霧社事件之所以會成爲小說調查的重點，因爲體驗川中島劫後餘生的存在狀態時，霧社事件是不可避免必須要處理的一件事情：『我並非偶然來到川中島，但純粹因爲「餘生」兩個字讓我居留下來，我想眞實體會「劫後餘生」而「事件」只是必須觸及的因緣』。[35]也因如此，論述上小說產生兩個不同層次的觀點，兩者相互指涉、相互形構，卻難以統合，形成彷如德希達口中的困境式關係。

　　首先，關於「事件的調查」之論述是以「當代」或者「當代觀點」爲出發點。然而，敘述者對當代觀點的態度有明顯的轉變，從一開始自信地採納當代觀點（視其爲有利的批判視角）轉爲一種身在當代只能從當代觀點發聲之無奈：『我出生在當代，成長在當代，教養在當代，渾身在當代，我只能在當代發聲』。[36]隨著當代觀點對調查的每一個面向無所不在地介入，強勢對過去史觀與既有解釋挑戰與質疑，事件的調查與思索逐漸變質成對敘事者的一種「要求」或一項「任務」，對事件的調查因此不再是體會劫後餘生所必須觸及的因緣，反而成爲被強加於身的乏味工作，完成後也必須『向「當代」報告』。[37]隨著事件調查的進行，當代觀點的批判性之侷限也慢慢浮現，初期呈現出不可質疑的權威性開始動搖，也使另一種餘生的觀點（或心境）成爲小說論述主流，補充（supplement）事件調查之不足。

　　當代觀點所採取的批判姿態接近相對性的觀點主義，對同一件事情透過思考不同的觀點（proliferation of points of view），揭露歷史眞實的不可能，結果是讓關於霧社事件的論述演變成一幅眾聲喧嘩的景象。因此敘述者在思考霧社事件本質的過程中，在探討霧社事件是政治性的反抗或傳統大規模的出草儀式時，大漢中心主義之外的觀點不斷地湧出，如情慾、原住民觀點，其中又包括不同性別、不同世代、不同部落、不同系譜、不同教育背景等等所產生出不同的歷史經驗之差異，藉此問題化任何霸權論述的正當性。小說中的當代觀點可以與上述歷史學家對「檔案熱」的理解做類比，兩者的批判姿態或對主流論述的質疑，是從一個外部的位置或「歷史他者」的角度發起；也因如此，不同族群、不同部落、不同世代、不同教育背景、不同性別、不同的情慾流動所產生異質性的發聲位置在當代觀點下被突顯出來。

　　這些對霧社事件的邊緣論述被提出後並沒有被定爲一尊，成爲理解霧社事件新的詮釋框架，反而受到小說另一個觀點，餘生倫理學，不斷地衝擊，兩者形成如檔案內部那種困境式經驗。小說不

33.見*History of Pain*第一章〝Musha 1930〞。
34.同註32，頁141。
35.同註32，頁185。
36.同註32，頁116。
37.同註32，頁85，141。

斷強調「事件」需要思索，而「餘生」不用思索（只需用心體會與觀察）。值得注意的是，餘生的「非思」與「不思」不是思索的否定，而是思索的可能性與不可能性的條件：

> 我分明即便我身處的餘生之地這樣的思索也是無關實際的，但「思索」有它內在的力量，直覺是與生俱來的本能之後是一種累積、一種強度，思索是稍稍遲來的本能之後同樣是一種累積、一種強韌，他可能因外在的因素修正，但不會停歇，甚至思索對象的一無意義和了無價值也無礙於思索，只有它內在的動力熄火之時「思索」才到了終結。[38]

敘事者最後決定終止對事件的調查並非事件已思無可思，單純只因思索的內在動力已到終結，調查成了令人窒息的道德律令慢慢喪失『日常閒情、心情觸動生活的本分自然』。[39]敘事者在小說結束前對事件與餘生，思考與非思兩者的關係做出深刻的反省：

我不是凌空俯視看到模糊的整體，便是夾在事物的間隙仔細看到了局部，兩者湊合起來便是我從事的工作嗎，我願望我散步島國只深深的凝視而不做任何記錄、批判或結論，但這樣的散步可能嗎？我們的文化教育不允許人『無所爲的永久散步』，無所爲是爲了有所爲做準備，或者在無所爲之中有了所爲。[40]

這段文字中，我們見證了餘生的無所爲，不僅沒有否定有所爲，反而是對霧社事件的思索與調查等「有所爲」之可能性條件，是思考的「內在動力」、「與生俱來的本能」。而事件思考與調查的有所爲也因餘生的非思不曾停歇。

另外，敘事者指出，『歷史只記錄「事件來去」無能觸及眞實感覺』。[41]如果歷史的眞實在當代觀點眾聲喧嘩的質疑下成爲不可能，「眞實」卻在餘生的倫理學中以另一種型態出現，餘生的眞實不是客觀的事實，亦非原始的完滿（primordial substance）或自我同一（self-identical）的在場，而是以「例外」的形式出現，如同檔案中的死亡驅力；這個例外是文明或象徵層次之外，是保存與紀錄的慾望之外，但這個例外卻也是豐富文明內涵，讓文明發展成爲可能的必要條件——是本體層次的純然懸置（pure suspension），思考的了無與意義的撤離。

下面兩段話勾勒出餘生倫理學的本體座標。第一段的脈絡是敘事者提出另一種對原始自然（或眞實）的看法，對比姑娘所追求回歸自然「火山爆」、「洪水流」的「執爽」（jouissance）經驗：

> 絕美是不可能的，那是人的意識架構的幻覺精緻是可能的人極喜歡精緻但人心無能長時忍受精緻，精緻與精緻之間需要粗率的對比休歇、或空的餘地，精緻才可能持續下去成爲文明的主流，原是自然的『意志』或『無心』。[42]

絕美與精緻，意志與無心等對立消弭於餘生的眞實中，兩者之間的「對比休歇」或「空的餘地」提供文明發展的條件，是其源頭與動力。此處「空的餘地」令人聯想到德希達的觀念「延異」

38.同註32，頁211。
39.同註32，頁142。
40.同註32，頁246。
41.同註32，頁232。
42.同註32，頁165。

於對立之間生產出的「空間」（spacing），一種超越且先於二元對立的間隙（*Positions* 27）。相同的隱喻在第二段引文再度出現，該段脈絡是事件調查時的訪問過程，被訪問者敘述對霧社事件的看法，敘述者聆聽並紀錄對方的見解，但在說話與傾聽之間是一種「空的間隙」、「純然的止境」，呼應了上述「無所為」與「空的餘地」呈現出的餘生之境：

> 說話和傾聽都需要這個逗點，逗點是一個空的間隙，純然的止境，並不為過去而思考也不會未來而準備。[43]

「空的餘地」、「空的間隙」與「純然的止境」提供餘生的本體座標，讓餘生的真實趨近德希達的幽靈學（hauntology）或者精神分析中的「極微差異」（minimal difference）；它不是一種超驗的存在（transcendent），而是存於歷史卻不受歷史支配，甚至能帶給歷史一個改變的契機。也因如此，敘述者希望餘生的真實能夠取代原始出草提供的狂喜極致體驗（primordial *jouissance*），成為豐富島國內涵的『另類型「原始儀式」』：『「出草」豐富了島國的內涵，這是不能竄改的歷史事實，但是如果「出草」是迷失方向而走錯了路，那麼有可能創生另類型「原始儀式」同樣可以豐富島國的內涵，這是不必壓抑的歷史想像』。[44]

在小說中，敘述者使用許多意象傳達餘生的經驗，其中一種是鹿瞳的凝視。一方面，讀者被告知，鹿瞳『通往心靈……不在意歷史』，是餘生的純粹凝視；但敘事者同時也提醒我們，鹿瞳的凝視雖刻骨銘心，但也受制外在的社會與經濟結構：

> 我所以在內心憐惜甚而珍視姑娘、小達雅、黑V以及鹿瞳少年少女，給他們一個正當經濟的家庭、良好的教育成長環境，他們的天生資質及外表幾年後極可能遠勝過平地都市的年輕人……幾十年來，島國半調子的政治社會故意漠視或歧視他們的潛力與權利，等到既得利益階層有了反省大罵自己或別人是『大漢沙文主義豬』時，他們已淪落社會底層多年了翻身幾乎不可能。[45]

在社會關係與經濟結構沒有改變的情況下，面對歷史他者的控訴，餘生的真實也顯得無能為力，一切的改變似乎只能在個人層次進行；如同鹿瞳的凝視只有如敘事者等早已體會餘生之境者懂得欣賞；但是如果我們想像稍有規模的具體改變，在沒有任何外力或運動介入迫使當權者進行改變的情況下，也只能依賴他們的良知，被動地期待他們受餘生倫理學或解構幽靈學感招，放棄權力的欲望——但這似乎是種不可能的任務。[46]

總結來講，《餘生》對霧社事件歷史書寫的問題化過程指向一種類似德希達口中的困境式的經驗。然而其餘生倫理學雖回應了「絕對他者」的招喚，但面對「歷史他者」的哀嚎卻也顯得無奈與無助，讓我們間接看見德希達檔案理論能產生的巨大思考能量與可能面對的歷史情境之難題。

43.同註32，頁187。
44.同註32，頁225。
45.同註32，頁151。
46.這種對社會關係與整體改變的無力感在敘事者離開川中島前再度被提及，他在離開前遇見一位孤獨老人，老人在三十歲那年娶了道澤社頭目的女兒，象徵兩社的和解。老人說餘生要過一種無思無慮，純然止境的生活，但他也不忘提醒，這樣的餘生隨時都會被打擾，因為「在我們的山谷外有更大的力量約束著我們」，同上註，頁249。

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The Renaissance of Cultural Memory:
Collected Papers of the Symposium on Reconstructing Art Histories in Contemporary Taiwan

One Justice, Each to Its Own: Time, Archive, and Writing

WU, Chien-Heng

Abstract

Based on the book, *Archive Fever*, this essay explains how justice is defined under the framework of deconstructionism, explores relative issues derived from it, and further discusses how to coordinate and define Derrida's archival theory under the heteroglossia of alternative, grassroots, marginalized and other historical viewpoints (outside of the official one) generated in the names of various identities and social groups. For example, many scholars have indicated that translating the French book title *Mal d'archive* into *Archive Fever* or *Dang'an Re* (Mandarin: 檔案熱) is rather inappropriate, because it may easily lead to confusion with the archival turn in other disciplines. If the French "mal" and the English "fever" mean differently— the former implies the meaning of "evil" and a metaphor of illness, while the latter contains both concepts of "becoming a trend" and "the passion to participate", how to negotiate between the two has become a main question in this essay. The essay takes Wu He's novel, *Remains of Life*, as an example to discuss how this novel uses the so-called "contemporary perspective" to deconstruct the official (or Han-centered) historical view on the Musha incident, and how the author writes about the life experience of the survivors with the ethics of Yusheng (the remains of life). In *Remains of Life*, the process of problematization of the historical writing about the Musha incident has pointed towards something similar to the aporetic experience proposed by Derrida. However, although the ethics of Yusheng has responded to the summons of the "absolute others", it appears to be powerless and helpless when encountering the lament of the "historical others". This has indirectly revealed to us the immense reflective capacity generated by Derrida's archival theory and the difficulties of historical conditions that we would possibly encounter.

I. The Deconstructive Justice

Derrida argues in *Archive Fever* that the science of archive must include the theory of archive institutionalization; that is, the theory of how the law is enacted and how the right is authorized. Therefore, at the very start of his book, he claims that all political powers exercise control over archive.[1] By selecting, arranging and reorganizing history and memory, power-holders can not only fabricate a set of definitive arguments on the history but also legalize the existing system effectively; furthermore, they can also manipulate the whole society's imagination of the future. In other words, the process of archivization not only reproduces and preserves the past events, but also involves exercising power and violence. Thus, the process of archivization is only manifested in different types and degrees of power; there are no objective, pure or innocent archives in the so-called power vacuum.

The construction of archives involves power and violence; this is neither a new argument nor the most impressive insight in Derrida's discourse of archives. The real innovation of Derrida's archival theory is that he refuses to discuss archive within the framework using archeology as a metaphor, and he refuses to simply define the function of archive as to speak up for the forgotten and marginalized history and to discover the ignored and unseen events of the past. Thus, for Derrida, archive is not the media to discover the truth. He is not willing to use the compensatory or restorative logic to consider archive as a method to implement justice. In fact, the writing of history under the influences of post institutionalism can hardly be defined as a reproduction of the real history. In addition to Derrida, Michel de Certeau and other historians continuously remind us that the writing of the history and the construction of archives are not absolutely objective. The enunciative positions of the researchers, the existing historical context, the institutions and the funds of the research, the technology development, the social ambiance, or even the transferential relation between the researchers and the research subjects all need to be considered. As a result, historical research has been instilled with reflexivity, and the research focus has also transferred from the discovery to the production process of knowledge.[2] For other historians and social activists, Derrida's views are considerably arguable. His views seem to insinuate that the deconstructive perspective on archive shows a hidden indifference, or even disregard for justice. However, even though Derrida refuses to regard archive as the discovery of the historical reality, it does not mean that his thought about archive is not related to justice. For Derrida, the pursuit of justice is the nutrition for deconstruction; moreover, the nature of the entire philosophical reflection is a certain type of traumatic experience. As what he has mentioned in an interview, philosophy needs to deal with traumatism repeatedly to remember an anamnesis of the forgetting and to survive from the trauma.[3] For Derrida, the deconstructive justice is the above-mentioned traumatic experience, and his thoughts about archivization provides an opportunity to reflect or implement (instead of achieving) justice.

Derrida believes that justice does not concern being delayed or having arrived. He brings justice a messianic "*à venir*" concept of time. Thus, we cannot comprehend the deconstructive justice based on the upholding of law and the emotional comfort brought by the delayed justice. In fact, Derrida regards justice and law as two scopes of different levels; their relationship, therefore, should be considered as overlapping

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1. Derrida Jacques, *Archive Fever*, trans., Eric Prenowitz, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. p.4.
2. Regarding post-structuralism historical research, see Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History* or Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*.
3. *Derrida Jacques, Points... Interviews, 1974-1994*, Trans., Peggy Kamuf, et al. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p.382.

of different levels. Law is not the means to achieve justice, and justice is not the ultimate solution to uphold the law either. On the one hand, the relationship between law and justice has always involved a certain logic of trade or certain acknowledgment and purposes. From an eye for an eye to justice being the causal extension of law, all these concepts are included in this framework. On the other hand, deconstructive justice precedes trade, circulation, acknowledgment, calculating and rules. It challenges the foundation of law while providing momentum for its mutation, making the deconstructive justice the precondition of the possibility and impossibility of law enforcement. According to Derrida, 'Such justice, which is not law, is the very movement of deconstruction at work in law and in the history of law, in political history and history itself'.[4]

Derrida has claimed in several occasions that justice is undeconstructible, or deconstruction itself is justice, because the spirit of deconstruction is to highlight the aporetic experience that justice has oriented.[5] In Derrida's thoughts, many important concepts are essentially connected to the aporia revealed by justice. From analyzing the *différance* and the trace of languages and texts at the early stage to the more political concepts, such as friendship, autoimmunity and messianicity at the later stage, these keywords of deconstruction have all exposed the confined, self-referential and self-fulfilled imaginations such as subject and sovereignty to an immanent and fundamental contradiction— from non-relational relation, illogical logic to messianicity without messianism, all of these have directed to aporia, trauma or "the experience of the impossible" and repeatedly demonstrate that metaphysics of presence is "always already" incomplete and disruptive.

It is noteworthy that we should avoid the common understanding of deconstruction and believe that the movement of deconstruction only aims at destruction. The word deconstruction is derived from Heidegger's "*Destruktion*" of metaphysics. Because of the literal meaning, the operation of deconstruction has often been simplified to destruction. However, in terms of the meaning at the philosophical level, neither Heidegger's *Destruktion* nor Derrida's deconstruction can be simply comprehended as the negative destruction without considering the constructive aspect. Derrida continuously reminds us that deconstruction is a bidirectional movement; in the process of destruction, elimination and dismantling exists a positive and creative effect; therefore, the above-mentioned aporetic experience has been formed. To further clarify, we must also distinguish deconstruction from the so-called creative destruction. Creative destruction still represents a linear process, which is the regeneration and reconstruction after destruction; this cannot feature the distinctive temporality of the aporetic experience precisely. We may say that only under very precise conditions can we interpret deconstruction as creative destruction. These conditions are: destruction and regeneration are continuously competing against each other within a closer relationship in which they are inter-referential, inter-constitutive, inter-repelling, but inter-constructed; the time of deconstruction does not concern arriving early or late, and destruction and creation have "always already" fallen into an inevitable and complex aporetic situation.

The deconstructive destruction, therefore, has led to the following paradoxical logic. From ontology to hauntology, deconstruction has dislocated and suspended the ontological presence, making the deconstructed objects undergo endless changes at the phenomenal level with unanticipated forms. Interpreted as such, the

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4. Derrida Jacques, "Fore of Law", *Acts of Religion*, ed., Gil Anidjar, trans., Mary Quaintance, New York: Routledge, 2002, p.254.

5. See "Force of Law", p.243, especially the three notions about deconstruction, justice and law proposed by Derrida after claiming that "deconstruction is justice": (1) Law can be deconstructed; (2) Justice is undeconstructible; (3) Deconstruction locates in the interval of the two. Regarding Derrida's elaboration of justice, also see *Specters of Marx* and another article "Faith and Knowledge" included in *Acts of Religion*.

operation of deconstruction can also be seen as an affirmative mechanism; it brings the effect of liberative variation instead of destruction while demolishing the stagnant system:

> Deconstruction is not a method for discovering that which resists the system; it consists, rather, in remarking in the reading and interpretation of texts, that what has made it possible for philosophers to affect a system is nothing other than a certain dysfunction or 'disadjustment', a certain incapacity to close the system. Wherever I have followed this investigative approach, it has been a question of showing that the system does not work, and that this dysfunction not only interrupts the system but itself accounts for the desire for system, which draws its élan from this very disadjoinment, or disjunction.[6]

Thus, we can say that although aporia and crises have made it impossible for the system to be confined and self-fulfilled, crises are also opportunities. They have exposed homogeneous and self-enclosed entity to the internal Other. This experience has brought an effect of *différance* to Self, which enables becoming and innovation; it also renders deconstruction an open concept of the future time— a Messiah or spectral concept of time which is "to come" but never arrives. This concept of time is the openness of the future: 'without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration…when the other and death...can come as a surprise at any moment.'[7]

II. Archive Fever

> I asked myself, what are the moments that really belongs to the archive... strictly speaking, belongs to the archivization moments which are technology-based experiences, rather than on-site and immediate memories.

> Derrida, *Archive Fever* [8]

Derrida has expressed the proposition that deconstruction is justice in different time periods, contexts and regarding different analytic subjects as well as using different terms. These concepts cannot be treated the same because of the minor differences caused by different time periods and contexts, but as mentioned above, they all refer to the dangerous yet liberative aporetic experience. Similarly, we can consider "a project of general archivology" proposed by Derrida in *Archive Fever* as one of the methods that is used by deconstruction to enable and practice justice.

Derrida points out that the nature of archive is both contradictory and disrupt, which is at once "institutive and conservative, revolutionary and traditional".[9] Archive includes two aspects: the process of archivization does not only include discovery and preservation of the archival desire (which used to be forgotten or repressed), but also imply another drive towards forgetting and destruction. These two inter-dissolving forces coexist in the archivization process; that is, the archivization process is murdering what it is preserving, and when the order is established, the seeds of an-archive are also sowed. Thus, preserving is the start of loss. The drive towards forgetting is regarded as another "silent vocation"[10] during the process of archive construction and preservation. In other words, the process of archivization reflects "the autoimmune logic" Derrida has mentioned in other occasions.

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6. Derrida Jacques, *A Taste for the Secret*, Trans. Giacomo Donis, Malden, MA: Polity, 2001, p.4.
7. Derrida Jacques, "Faith and Knowledge", *Acts of Religion*, ed., Gil Anidjar, trans., Samuel Weber, New York: Routledge, 2002, 40-101, p.56.
8. Derrida Jacques, *Archive Fever*, op. cit.
9. Ibid., p.7.
10. See note 8, p.10.

In biology, autoimmunity is a self-devouring phenomenon that happens when any disorder occurs in the immune system of biological organisms. The function of antibodies is to protect bodies from outside antigens, such as a virus. However, under certain circumstances, the antibodies are making disordered responses to attack organs and tissues of the bodies. Derrida believes that the autoimmunity which occurs in biology can also be observed in other areas ("Faith and Knowledge" 80n27).[11] If we further extend the biological observations by discussing it in an archivization context, we can discover that the process of archivization also follows the same autoimmune logic. As Derrida has said, 'the archive always works, and *a priori*, against itself.'[12]

For example, in the book, *Geneses, Genealogies, Genres and Genius,* Derria addressed that his close friend, Hélène Cixous's archives are now stored in the Bibliotheque Nationale de France (BNF). The BNF is a public space which holds the dominative power, and Cixous' donations (gifts) have not only enriched the collections of the BNF but also posed a danger to the order of the classification of the BNF. Martin McQuillan indicates that Cixous' works cannot be classified since her texts are more inclusive than the library where the texts are stored and cannot be included in the order of the classification in the library. Thus, it has disrupted the index structure of the library, proving what has been proposed by Derrida that the drive towards destruction and forgetting exists within archive.[13]

Similar examples have occurred in many different forms in the age of the Internet. Take file backup in the daily life for example, Slavoj Žižek proposes a concept named "interpassivity", which is not a concept discussed within the context of Derrida's archival theory. However, we can verify Derrida's argument by citing the examples derived from it. Slavoj Žižek indicates that when the VCR first occurred as a medium of video recording, many people, including himself, would use the VCR to record films playing on TV. While recording the films, the users did not watch the films simultaneously because of busyness or other reasons; instead, they let the VCR "watch the film" for them. The users would feel very satisfied when the VCR recording is completed and a file is formed, as if they had enjoyed watching the film themselves. The archivization of the VCR has then become an extremely contradictory phenomenon; that is, 'the immediate effect of owning a VCR is that one effectively watches fewer films than in the good old days of a simple TV set.'[14] Certainly, the focus of Slavoj Žižek is the paradoxical phenomenon of subject being passive and object being active, but this example also reveals that medium recording generates something similar to the autoimmune logic. Archive has an internal drive towards forgetting or destruction while recording; and the recording of the VCR has allowed users to adopt an attitude that they can forget these films feeling at ease because the films are stored safely by the VCR. This example reveals a common phenomenon of archivization in daily lives; that is, the more securely the archives are saved, the more comfortable the users can feel to forget the archives (such as not using them or indefinitely delaying the use of them to the future).[15]

This means archives all have dual functions. Firstly, the common and conversant archival projects intent to safely preserve memories, writings or the past events. Derrida indicates that archive contains

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11. Derrida Jacques, "Faith and Knowledge," *Acts of Religion*, Ed., Gil Anidjar, Trans., Samuel Weber, New York: Routledge, 2002. p.80, 27.
12. Ibid., p.12.
13. See the preface written by McQuillan for this book.
14. Zizek, Slavoj, *How to Read Lacan*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2007, p.24.
15. "The right to be forgotten" is another example worth discussing: the big data keeps collecting information and connects certain people's identities constantly with a certain event of the past by choosing, arranging and combining keywords; for these people, memory is a persistent nightmare and the unbearable heaviness of life; therefore, another opinion emerges to request the right to be forgotten, and this also seems to reflect the self-obliterating death drive within the archival structure.

the concept of *arkhē* in Greek; such concept coordinates two principles— one is the commencement of nature and the history, while the other is the commandment of the law. Within the concept of *arkhē*, the combination of "order" and "command" signifies that the recording of the "order" or the "commencement" of events in archives operates within the judicial domain.[16]

This becomes more obvious by analyzing the Greek etymon of archive, *arkheion. Arkheion* refers to the residence of archons in the ancient Greek poleis. These citizens who owned the political powers were also considered owning the right to enact and represent the law. Official documents stored in their residence, and the archons became the guardians of the documents. Not only did they ensure that the documents are secure, they were also given the right and the ability to interpret the documents. This is the so-called "consignation" function, which is a principle of the gathering together of signs, topos and nomos; at the same time, the venues for storing archives have the power to assign, identify, classify, integrate, etc., rendering archive to form a closed system and a synchronic entirety. Thus, these documents are not merely archival objects, but we can also witness the call of law in them.[17] Derrida names this consignation function as archive or conservation drive. When practicing the justice of conservation, it is inevitable to make choices about what is and what is not worth preserving. Thus, the process of preserving, addendum or inclusion also involves the demarcation of the internal and external boundaries, exposing it to an exclusive mechanism. This has not only brought a political aspect to the archivization, but also turned archive into a limited record due to the difference in the conditions of choices.

In the above-mentioned analysis of archive's Greek etymon, Derrida emphasizes the physical presence of archives. In addition to specifying the space and the specific people who exercise the right, he also emphasizes that the archival drive has a concept of time that looks back at the past to preserve the sequential combination caused by natural or historical events and to protect it from fading away with time.

Indeed, the existence of archives is to preserve memories. However, as supplementary media, archive has distorted the memories while preserving them. Derrida has classified memories into two types: The first type is anamnesis, the internal, on-site and immediate memories; the second type is *hypomnēma*, the external and auxiliary memories/differences acquired through media (such as writing, printing, emails or other technological supplements). The desire of archives is to capture and preserve immediate and on-site original memories without distortions. However, as a form of media, archive has inevitably brought in external intervention— this means that when preserving memories, the archive's inscription of the preserved objects can also be considered as a reproduction, because the differences and interventions of the media have "always already" rendered the marks of heterogeneity to the original content: 'The archive is hypomnesic... If there is no archive without consignation in an external place which assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of reimpression, then we must also remember that repetition itself, the logic of repetition, indeed the repetition compulsion, according to Freud, indissociable from the death drive. And thus from destruction.'[18] Therefore, the historical reality is constantly being reproduced due to the innovation of archival technology, and therefore it is constantly changing.

In simple terms, the process of archivization concerns the differences of the preservation methods. Derrida believes that the "archivable content" changes based on the degree of technological development. During different periods of time, the methods of recording and preserving are influenced by the differences

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16. Zizek, Slavoj, *How to Read Lacan*, op. cit, p.1.
17. See note 8, pp.2, 3.
18. See note 8, pp.11, 12.

in technology development, the evolution of the preservation techniques or the change of research methodology; furthermore, the differences of the archiving structure can not only influence the way that archives are preserved, but also determine the content of the archives that can be preserved: 'The archive, as printing, writing, prosthesis, or hypomnesic technique in general is not only the place for stocking and for conserving an archive content of *the past which* would exist in any case...No, the technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable content...The archivization produces as much as it records the event. This is also our political experience of the so-called news media.'[19] The evolution of science and technology, therefore, produces another type of boundary at the structural level; that is, the political experience has infiltrated the uncertainty of future into the process of archival construction and also turned archives into an unstable and limited construction.[20]

If archive is a limited construction, its finitude is caused by two reasons: The first one is the choices that the anchors made when they were exercising the right of consignation, such as which contents can be archived and preserved for the future generation to read and which contents should be excluded. These choices have precluded the entirety and comprehensiveness of archives and therefore have constituted the finitude of archives. The second reason stems from the evolution of the preservation techniques mentioned above. Not only can the differences of archival structure determine the archivable content, but archives will also experience constant replication and inscription as well as interlocking and overlapping reproduction. This repetition is not the mechanical repetition of the same, but an "iterability" that possesses a deconstructive effect, creating alteration during iteration.[21] Therefore, due to the supplementary media, memories become incomplete when being preserved, and they are constantly evacuating, splitting and experiencing self-alienation, leaving only marks and tracks instead of immediate and vivid anamnesis. This is also the reason why Derrida claims that 'the archive...will never be either memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience. On the contrary: the archive takes place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of the said memory.'[22]

Derrida names this drive towards forgetting Archive Fever (or Archive Evil), which is the internal contradiction of archive as well as the condition of the possibility and impossibility of archival drive— 'Without this evil, which is also *archive fever*, the desire and the disorder of archive, there would be neither assignation nor consignation.'[23] He borrows the concept of Freudian psychoanalysis, "the death drive", to discuss the unconsciousness within archives, elevating this drive towards destruction to an inner finitude that is unavoidable in the preservation of archives. Paradoxically, because of the internal finitude of archive, the conservative archival desire and the obliterating death drive have entered an infinite aporetic cycle; the archival desire is never fully satisfied because the specter-like death drive constantly returns, but as a result, it is also continuously being generated. As the above-mentioned relationship between deconstruction and structure proposed by Derrida, a similar contradiction exists in the archives. The impossibility of a closed system is also the condition of possibility of the transformation and regeneration of the system. Such spectral logic has precluded the return of the history and the presence of memory, while only driven by the internal impossibility can archival drive continue growing, arousing wave after wave of passion for archival construction.

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19. See note 8, pp.16, 17.
20. See note 8, pp.16, 17.
21. See note 8, p.90.
22. See note 8, p.11.
23. See note 8, p.81.

Overall, Derrida's discourse on archive emphasizes the aporetic experience formed during the process of archivization by two inter-repelling but not purely antagonistic drives.[24] These two drives bring archive a type of distinctive temporality, which orients the process of archivization towards the past and the future at the same time, simultaneously recording the past and opening an uncertain future. He connects the liberating aporetic experience with the elaboration of messianicity in *Specters of Marx*, emphasizing that the spectral archival structure goes beyond the binary oppositions between presence and absence as well as the distinction of the past, the present and the future, as it suspends the presence of meaning and being as presence.

Specter is a special kind of existence, existing in the liminal space between being and non-being, existence and non-existence, life and death, reality and unreality, as well as presence and absence. It precedes the binary oppositions listed above and becomes the condition of (im)possibility.[25] Derrida emphasizes, 'A spectral messianicity is at work in the concept of the archive and ties it… to a very singular experience of the promise.'[26] The singular experience of the promise is the encounter with trauma and with "the experience of the impossible". It is a promise that the present inevitably shoulders yet is unable to fulfill for the past. Because it is unfulfillable, it can only be constantly returned to through practice in the future. This kind of experience is also referred to as the deconstructive justice— justice is not a compensation, but a promise. It is a promise that the present holds to the memory of injustice in the past and the writing of justice in the future. Justice is not a kind of state, but a kind of doing. However, this kind of doing has neither a blueprint to follow nor a planned pathway to walk on, and it is definitely not an imaginary utopia that can be fulfilled in the foreseeable future. It is being at the interval between archive and an-archive and negotiating about the conflicts and the being of the two. This interval is the locus of justice where the taking place of "to come" occurs. Derrida once said that we can be confident about our legitimacy, but we cannot be sure if "I am just".[27] Because of that, the indetermination of justice has urged us to constantly shoulder the responsibility of encountering the Other.[28] Interpreted from this aspect, the justice of deconstruction is an affirmative action. The burial, the absence and the disappearance of memories have driven the passion for excavating archives, enabling the dust-laden archives to be seen again, but re-arranging and organizing the archives will bring about not only a new opportunity for interpreting the history, but also the crisis that the history may become rigid again. The justice of "Archive Fever" moves between these two ends. It promises to continually pay close attention to (the injustice of) the past, yet at the same time, continues to loosen the potential rigidity of archiving.

Different from the traditional view that archive is connected to the past, Derrida believes that the issues of archive also concern the future. In terms of the relationship between archive and the future, we must firstly highlight a notable change in Derrida's theoretical perspective. At first, he defined the "assignation" and "consignation" functions of archive by drawing on the concrete forms of space and power, emphasizing

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24. Martin Haägglund also reminds us that immunity and autoimmune logic used in other fields, especially in political field, can lead to two entirely different political meanings; the formation of identity or community dependents on the immune logic while the autoimmune logic refers to a 'to come' open future; these two meanings seem to be quite different, but cannot be considered as the opposite which is black or white ("Autoimmunity of Religion" 195). The relationship between the justice and the law is the same, although these two have significant differences, Derrida emphasizes the requirement of negotiation between these two within the aporetic experience, rather than the opposing aspect. Regarding this, see "*Force of Law*", p.251.
25. See note 8, p.84.
26. See note 8, p.36.
27. See "*Force of Law*", p.245.
28. "The Other" in Derrida's discourse is not the one under the framework that Self and the Other are seen as opposites. The Other in deconstruction refers to a deeper heterogeneity which precedes the distinction of Self and the Other. This heterogeneity stems from the ontological self-fissuring: being different from/beyond Self.

the tangible space of archives (such as the premises for storing them) and how archons exercised legal and political power on the past. Later, when he discussed the archival theory in the discourse of psychoanalysis and the death drive, the previous concrete image of archives had been spectralized, and the concept of time had also shifted from the past to the openness of "to-come", infiltrating iterability into the archive drive which is inclined to order, stability and constancy with an indeterminate and radical concept of time.[29]

Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis has provided the foundation for Derrida to contemplate upon archives. From the deconstructive perspective, Archive Fever refers to the autoimmune logic that the structure of archives has represented. Such logic signifies that the eradication of memory is not a threat coming from outside or a later time; rather, it is an *a priori* trauma which exists in the structure of archives. However, translating the French book title *Mal d'archive* into *Archive Fever* or *Dang'an Re* (Mandarin: 檔案熱) has caused some controversies, and it may easily lead to confusion with the archival turn in other disciplines. If "mal" and "fever" mean differently— the former implies the meaning of "evil" and a metaphor of illness, while the latter also contains concepts of "becoming a trend" and "the passion to participate", how to negotiate between the two has become an important issue.

Some critics argue that Derrida's archival theory is too abstract and general, and it doesn't consider the authentic experience of the archive users. Carolyn Steedman has pointed out that after reading Derrida's *Archive Fever*, she feels strange to the archive discussed in the book, since it is completely different from the archival work she has been doing and has understood for a long time (1159-1163, passim). There seems to be an impassable chasm between archive as metaphor proposed by philosophers and archive as practice. In addition, even though Derrida has deconstructed the relationship between archive and power to loosen the power domination over archive and has introduced an open concept of future time, the deconstructive methodology he uses, however, is a kind of criticism at the ontological level, which focuses on the inevitable inner limitation of archive. Although this initiative is radical and has a warning effect, criticism at the ontological level has a preemptive characteristic, and it is a one-size-fits-all concept which is applied to the development of all archives, without considering special historical conditions, various positions of voice and the unfair relationship of power among them. Therefore, many people believe that in addition to deconstruction, writing new archives to testify for the gagged or forgotten history may be a more concrete and effective way to challenge the official discourse hegemony of archives. In addition, archives are also concrete existence at the phenomenal level. The political experience brought by new media cannot limit the change in the structures of archivization which Derrida has discussed. New media also popularize the methods of archiving, enabling more and more people to use various platforms to challenge the official monopoly on the interpretation of archives. These activities do not solely discover a more reliable historical reality in the name of personal or group experiences; more importantly, they are gestures of protest that subjects make for the pursuit of justice. With the interpretation right of democratic archives, they have propelled archives from the traditional guardian monopoly to a state of heteroglossia. This type of archive fever refers to the participation of the archival development; through regarding the production of new knowledge as the process of subjective activities and reconstruction, it emphasizes the concept of regarding archives as public-shared space and democratic places.[30]

The struggle between politics and morality in these two types of interpretation on Archive Fever has been elaborated in literature by Wu He's novel, *Remains of Life*. Therefore, the last part of this essay takes

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29. Boulter Jonathan, *Melancholy and the Archive*, New York: Continuum, 2011, p.5.
30. See Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance"; Marlene Manoff, "Theories of the Archive from Across the Disciplines"; Ariella Azoulay, "Archive". For the criticism of experience, see Scott, "The Evidence of Experience".

Remains of Life as an example to discuss how this novel uses the "contemporary perspective" to deconstruct the official (or Han-centered) historical view on the Musha incident, and how the author writes about the life experience of the survivors with the ethics of Yusheng (the remains of life).[31]

III. The Ethics of Yusheng

'Do you believe in that kind of sublime experience?' Girl looked down for a while, 'no, never once, but I believe it feels like surging flood and exploding volcano, only then is life worth living'…. the question is does such a state where one reaches ecstasy to the point that one feels like a 'surging flood or an exploding volcano' even exist, I have my doubt over the existence of such a state in my life, during the time of my own remaining life I still don't know what kind of 'real' this question points to, perhaps it doesn't need to be answered, hoping that life reveals the real and doesn't waste away, gradually one comes to a point where that voice deep inside asks you to let go of expectations, and when it comes, experience it with your heart, that's it…. doesn't the fact that the raw sexual desire of the primordial real can only be experienced through 'the meeting of hearts' suggests the absurdity and sadness of life.

Wu He, *Remains of Life*[32]

Written by Wu He, *Remains of Life* is a novel about how the narrator and the residents of Riverisle face their lives after surviving the calamity. The historical background investigated by the novel is the Musha incident happened during the Japanese occupation; however, *Remains of Life* has a very distinguished difference from other past literal texts that deal with the Musha incident. In *A History of Pain*, Michael Berry analyzes the historical role and the literary representation of "the Musha incident" in Taiwan after World War II, indicating that writers with the Greater China ideology generally defined the Musha incident as a national resistance and even listed Mona Rudo's heroic deed among Chinese martyrs and vanguards of the past, and by doing so, incorporated the Musha incident and made it a commendable epic chapter in the Chinese history. Later, local arguments regarded Taiwan's history as a series of resistance. They also incorporated the Musha incident into a local historical view, having its anti-colonized confrontation echo the anti-colonized spirits of Taiwanese people against authoritarianism of the Kuomintang (KMT). This has strengthened the concept that both Taiwanese people and the aboriginals were in a vulnerable position of being dominated, but at the same time, it also over-extended the spectrum of the oppressed, leading to a loss of focus and ignoring the hegemony and exploitation that the Han people exerted on the aboriginals in general. From this, one can see the inextricable relationship between power and literature as archives. It was not until the publication of Wu He's *Remains of Life* that the archivization of the Musha incident in literature was deconstructed and disclosed with a critical view.[33]

First of all, the main focus of the novel is not the investigation about the historical reality of the Musha incident. Even though it has raised a dialectical query about the political and the ritualistic interpretation regarding the Musha incident, the purpose is not to propose a definite argument about the historical reality

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31. The following discussion about *Remains of Life* is not comprehensive; only several key points are selected and discussed under the context of Derrida's discourse of archive. My other essay, "Untimely Meditations: The Contemporary, the Philosophy of Walking, and Other Related Matters in Wu He's *Remains of Life*" (will soon be released, included in *Musha 1930*, an essay collection regarding the Musha incident compiled by Michael Berry) has a more detailed discussion on the issue of ethics in *Remains of Life*. In addition, Chen Chun-Yan's essay, "Being-in-Common in Postcolonial Taiwan", is well worth reading. This essay takes *Remains of Life* as an example to illustrate Jean-Luc Nancy's ontological political view, attempting to open up a possibility beyond the scope of identity politics for post-colonial Taiwan.
32. Wu He. *Remains of Life*. Taipei: Rye Field, 1999.
33. See *History of Pain*, Chapter one, "Musha 1930".

of the incident after questioning. In fact, the narrator reminds readers that the historical reality doesn't really exist; in the novel, all of the investigations about the Musha incident have been carried out under the framework of "an imaginary reality".[34] The reason why the Musha incident becomes the focus of investigation is that when experiencing the existing state of the remains of life in Riverisle, the Musha incident is an inevitable event to be dealt with— 'I didn't come to Riverisle by accident, but it was purely those words, "Remains of Life", that made me stay. I wanted to truly understand "the remains of life after the calamity", and "the incident" was simply a cause I had to touch upon.'[35] As a result, two perspectives of different levels occur in the novel. These two perspectives are inter-referential, inter-constitutive, yet unable to be integrated, forming a relationship similar to the aporetic relationship mentioned by Derrida.

To begin with, the arguments regarding "the investigation of the incident" is based on "the contemporary" or "a contemporary perspective". However, the narrator's attitude towards the contemporary perspective has changed significantly. At the beginning, he confidently adopts the contemporary perspective (regarding it as a beneficial critical viewpoint), but later, his attitude changes into a sense of helplessness, because being in the contemporary era, one can only voice from the contemporary perspective: 'I was born into the contemporary, raised in the contemporary, educated in the contemporary, all of me is in the contemporary, so I can only speak from the perspective of the contemporary.'[36] With the contemporary perspective ubiquitously interfering with every aspect of the investigation, strongly challenging and questioning the past historical perspective and the existing interpretation, the investigation and contemplation of the incident gradually become a "demand" or a "duty" for the narrator. Therefore, the investigation of the incident is no longer a cause to experience the remains of life after the calamity; rather, it becomes the dull work which is imposed on him and should be 'reported to "the contemporary"' after finished.[37] With the progress of the investigation, the limitation of criticalness of the contemporary perspective slowly emerges, and the unquestionable authority appeared at the beginning starts to shake. As a result, the other perspective (or mindset) becomes the mainstream of the discourse in the novel, supplementing the insufficiency of the investigation.

The critical gesture made by the contemporary perspective is akin to perspectivism, which unveils the impossibility of historical reality through proliferation of points of view on the same subject, resulting in the discourses of the Musha incident becoming a scene of heteroglossia. Thus, in the process of contemplating the essence of the Musha incident and discussing whether this incident is a political resistance or a traditional head-hunting ritual, perspectives outside of Han centralism continue to emerge, such as erotic desire and aboriginal perspectives, which further include different historical experiences generated by different genders, generations, tribes, genealogies, educational backgrounds and so on; these perspectives problematize the righteousness of any hegemonic discourse. The contemporary perspective in the novel can be analogized to the historians' understandings of "Archive Fever" mentioned above. In both situations, the critical gestures or the questioning about the mainstream discourse are originated from an outside position or the angle of the "historical others", and because of this, the different positions of voicing, which are generated by different communities, tribes, generations, educational backgrounds, genders, and movements of erotic desire, are highlighted under the contemporary perspective.

After these marginalized discourses about the Musha incident are proposed, they are not defined as

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34. See note 32, p.141.
35. See note 32, p.185.
36. See note 32, p.116.
37. See note 32, pp.85, 141.

the authority and regarded as a new explanatory framework to interpret the incident; on the other hand, they are constantly impacted by the other perspective in the novel— the ethics of Yusheng, and the two have formed an aporetic experience similar to the one in archive. The novel constantly emphasizes that "the incident" needs to be contemplated, while "the remains of life" do not (since it only requires wholehearted understanding and observation). It is noteworthy that the "non-thinking" and "not-thinking" of the remains of life are not a denial of contemplation, but the conditions of possibility and impossibility for contemplation.

> Clearly even though such contemplation in a place where people live out their remains of life bears no practical meaning, yet "thinking" has its immanent force, intuition is an inborn ability, after that comes accumulation and intensification, thinking is of the same kind of accumulation and intensification following on the heels of the instinct, it might get modified on account of external factors, but it will not cease to think, it matters not whether the object of reflection has no meaning and value, "thinking" will cease to be only when its inner force becomes extinguished.[38]

The narrator eventually decides to stop investigating the incident, not because there is nothing left to be thought about, but simply because the inner force for thinking has ceased. Investigation has become a suffocating moral mandate and slowly loses 'the naturalness of everyday life and the mood that touches life'.[39] Before the end of the novel, the narrator deeply reflects on the relationships between the incident and the remains of life and between thinking and non-thinking.

> I either gaze at an indistinct whole from afar or pore over a fragmented part in-between things, does my work [investigation] consist of a combination of these two operations, I hope I can walk inside this island nation, gazing deeply without any intent to record, criticize, or conclude, but is such a walk possible? Our culture and education proscribes people from engaging in 'purposeless and permanent stroll,' purposelessness is the preparation for purposefulness, or perhaps purposefulness arises from purposelessness.[40]

In this passage, we witness the non-doing in the remains of life, which doesn't deny the concept of doing; on the contrary, it is the condition of possibility for the "doing", such as the contemplation and the investigation of the Musha incident, and it is also the "inner force" and the "inborn ability" of thinking. Additionally, due to the non-thinking of the remains of life, such contemplation and investigation of the incident never cease.

Furthermore, the narrator has indicated that 'the history only records "the coming and going of the incident," without reaching the real feelings.'[41] While it may be impossible to obtain the historical reality in the heteroglossia of the contemporary perspectives, "the reality" appears in another form in the ethics of Yusheng. The reality of the remains of life is neither an objective truth nor a primordial substance or a self-identical presence; instead, it appears in an "exceptional" form, similar to the death drive in archive. This exception is excluded from the civilized or symbolic level, and it is excluded from the desire of preserving and recording. However, this exception is also the essential requirement for enriching the content and enabling the development of civilization— it is the pure suspension at the ontological level, the emptiness of contemplation, and the withdrawal of meanings.

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38. See note 32, p.211.
39. See note 32, p.142.
40. See note 32, p.246.
41. See note 32, p.232.

The following two passages have outlined the ontological coordinates regarding the ethics of the remains of life. In the context of the first passage, the narrator proposes another perspective on the primitive nature (or reality), in contrast with the "*jouissance*" experience of returning to the nature like "the exploding volcano" and "the surging flood" that Girl has pursued.

> After all it is impossible to achieve perfection, perfection is nothing but a fantasy constructed by human consciousness, but refinement is a possibility and humans adore refinement however the human heart cannot tolerate too much refinement, refinement must occasionally take a break from itself with a contrast of crudeness, or create a space of emptiness, only then can refinement sustain itself and become the leading force of civilization, which had originally been the 'will' or 'non-will' of nature.[42]

The contrasts, such as between perfection and refinement and between will and non-will disappear in the reality of the remains of life. The "contrary break" or the "space of emptiness" between the two provides the condition for the development of civilization, serving as its origin and motive. The "space of emptiness" here can be associated with Derrida's "différance"— the "spacing" created between the opposites, an interstice which transcends and precedes the binary oppositions (Positions 27). The same metaphor reappears in the second paragraph, the context of which is the interview in the investigation of the incident. The interviewee explains his thoughts about the Musha incident, and the narrator listens and records his opinions. However, between talking and speaking are an "empty interstice" and a "pure suspension", which have echoed to the remains of life presented by the "non-doing" and the "space of emptiness" mentioned above.

> Sometimes you need a comma between talking and listening, comma is an empty interstice, a pure suspension from reflecting on the past and preparing for the future.[43]

"The space of emptiness", "the empty interstice" and "the pure suspension" have provided the ontological coordinates of the remains of life, directing the reality of the remains of life towards Derrida's hauntology or the "minimal difference" in psychoanalysis. This reality is not a transcendent existence; rather, it exists in but is not dominated by the history, and it can even bring an opportunity of change to the history. Furthermore, because of this, the narrator hopes that the reality of the remains of life can replace the primordial *jouissance* provided by the primal head-hunting activity and become 'the alternative "primal ritual"' that enriches the inner meaning of the island nation— '"Headhunting" has enriched the inner meaning of this island nation, this is a historical fact that cannot be altered, but if "headhunting" was a bad choice leading to a wrong path, then it may be possible to create an alternative "primal ritual" that can also enrich the inner meaning of this island nation, this is part of a historical imagination that need not be suppressed.'[44]

In the novel, the narrator uses various images to convey the experience of the remains of life, one of which is the gaze of the deer eyes. On the one hand, readers are informed that the deer eyes 'go straight to the soul… and do not concern about the history'; it is the pure gaze of the remains of life. On the other hand, the narrator also reminds us that although the gaze of the deer eyes is unforgettable, it is also constrained by the outside social and economic structures:

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42. See note 32, p.165.
43. See note 32, p.187.
44. See note 32, p.225.

That is why deep down I feel such pity and affection for Girl, Little Daya, Black V, and the young deer eyes, I would like to give them all an economically stable family, with a good learning environment, with their natural gifts and good looks they would most likely surpass the achievements of young city kids down in the plains…. for decades, the half-baked political society of this island nation intentionally overlooked or discriminated against their potentials and rights, by the time the privileged class began self-reflection, cursing themselves or others as 'Han chauvinist pigs,' indigenous groups had already sunk to the very bottom of the social ladder for so long that it was virtually impossible for them to get back on their feet".[45]

Under the circumstances that the social relationship and the economic structure have not changed, when facing the accusation of the historical others, the reality of the remains of life seems to be impotent, and it appears that all the changes can only be carried out at an individual level, as the gaze of the deer eyes can only be appreciated by those who have already experienced the remains of life like the narrator. Nevertheless, if we imagine a specific change on a larger scale, when no external force or activities intervene to force the authorities to change, we can only depend on their conscience and passively expect them to be inspired by the ethics of Yusheng or the deconstructive hauntology and abandon their desire for power— but this seems to be an impossible mission.[46]

In conclusion, in *Remains of Life*, the problematization of the historical writing about the Musha incident has pointed towards something akin to the aporetic experience proposed by Derrida. However, although the ethics of the remains of life has responded to the summons of the "absolute others", it appears to be powerless and helpless when encountering the lament of the "historical others". This has indirectly revealed to us the immense reflective capacity generated by Derrida's archival theory and the difficulties of historical conditions that we would possibly encounter. (Translated by CHEN, Mavis)

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45. See note 32, p.151.

46. This powerlessness about the social relationship and the entire change is mentioned again when the narrator leaves the Riverisle. Before leaving, he met a solitary old man who married the daughter of the Tauda leader at the age of thirty, symbolizing the reconciliation of the two tribes. The old man says he would like to lead a free-minded and pure life in his remains of life, but he also reminds us that such remains of life can be disrupted anytime, because 'outside of our valley exists a stronger power that restricts us.' See note 32, p.249.